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Return Predictability: The Dual Signaling Hypothesis of Stock Splits 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to differentiate between optimistic splits and overoptimistic/opportunistic splits. 
Although markets do not distinguish between these two groups at the split announcement time, 
optimistic (over-optimistic/opportunistic) splits precede positive (negative) long-term buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. Using the calendar month portfolio approach, we show that the zero-
investment, ex-ante identifiable, and fully implementable trading strategy proposed in this paper 
can generate economically and statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Our findings 
indicate that pre-split earnings management and how it relates to managers’ incentives, is an 
omitted variable in the studies of post-split long-term abnormal returns. 
 
Keywords: Stock Splits, Earnings Management, Long-term Stock Returns, Dual-signaling 
Hypothesis. 
JEL classification: G11, G12, G14, G35, M41. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969, henceforth, FFJR), the 
finance literature provides several alternative explanations for conducting a stock split. A manager 
can conduct a stock split to signal positive private information (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; 
McNichols and Dravid, 1990; Desai and Jain, 1997), to lower a stock price to a preferable range 
(Lamoureux and Poon, 1987; Dyl and Elliott, 2006), and to boost stock liquidity (Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens, 1996; and Lin, Singh, and Yu, 2009).1 However, Weld et al. (2009) argue that none 
of these explanations actually justify conducting a stock split. In order to further explore the 
signaling hypothesis, recent papers have investigated the dual use of a stock split and earnings 
management. For example, Louis and Robinson (2005) argue that combining a split and 
discretionary accruals may be an effective means of communicating managers’ private information, 
rather than a means of deceiving shareholders. They state that “the stock split signal lends 
credibility to the accrual signal whereas the accrual signal reinforces the split signal.” 2 By contrast, 
Guo, Liu, and Song (2008) argue that managers support their already inflated stock prices (due to 
aggressive earnings management) by announcing stock splits. They argue that managers use that 
approach to delay stock price corrections before stock-financed acquisitions. The extant literature 
on stock split return predictability does not differentiate between announcement and/or long-term 
returns of optimistic splits (Louis and Robinson, 2005) and opportunistic splits (Guo, Liu, and 
Song, 2008). This paper aims to contribute to this gap in the stock split return predictability 
literature.  
 
1 Another explanation for the use of stock splits is the desire of companies to supply shares at lower prices when 
investors are more willing to pay premiums for cheaper stocks. For a comprehensive review of different motives for 
stock splits, please see Minnick and Raman (2014).  
2 See Louis and Robinson (2005). PP. 361. 
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Investigating the dual use of stock splits and earnings management, and its implications on 
the announcement as well as long-term split returns would enable us to better understand market 
reaction to different types of splits and to better understand results in the prior literature. 
In this paper, we try to differentiate between two groups of stock splitters. The first group 
(optimistic splitters) consists of firms that conduct stock splits without a high degree of earnings 
management to convey positive private information. The second group 
(overoptimistic/opportunistic splitters) consists of firms that combine stock splits with a high 
degree of earnings management as a reflection of overestimation of, or to send a false signal about, 
future earnings streams. Specifically, we use the degree of pre-split earnings management (through 
both discretionary accruals and real activities management [RAM] measured by abnormal cash 
flows) as a differentiating factor between these two groups of stock splits. Our results show that 
investors do not differentiate between these two types of stock splits at the time of the 
announcement. However, these two types have strikingly different long-term returns. Splits 
conducted by optimistic firms are followed by significantly positive long-term abnormal returns. 
By contrast, splits conducted by overoptimistic/opportunistic firms are followed by significantly 
negative long-term abnormal returns. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first 
empirical evidence that long-term returns are significantly negative for an ex-ante identifiable 
group of stock splits.  
Using tercile double ranking, we construct nine portfolios of stock splits ranked based on 
the degree of earnings management (henceforth, portfolios M1: M9). Portfolio M1 includes firms 
in the bottom discretionary accruals and RAM terciles prior to a stock split. At the other extreme, 
portfolio M9 includes firms in the top discretionary accruals and RAM terciles prior to a stock 
split. We argue that portfolios at the top of this ranking are more associated with managerial over-
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optimism/opportunism while portfolios at the bottom of this ranking are more associated with 
managerial optimism. We first investigate whether investors differentiate between optimistic splits 
and overoptimistic/opportunistic splits at the time of the split announcement. Our results indicate 
that investors do not differentiate between these two groups of splits at the time of the 
announcement. Inversely, there is weak evidence that investors have a better reaction to 
overoptimistic/opportunistic splits. This evidence is consistent with Louis and Robinson (2005). 
Next, we investigate the long-term returns of optimistic splits and 
overoptimistic/opportunistic split. The main premises of this paper are that optimistic splits are 
expected to be followed by positive abnormal returns while overoptimistic/opportunistic splits are 
expected to observe return reversals in the post-split period. Our buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) results show that the one-year BHAR for portfolio M1 is 5.5 percent, a figure in stark 
contrast to that of portfolio M9 which has a one-year BHAR of -16 percent during a comparable 
period. In addition to using the BHAR approach, we test our conjectures using the calendar month 
portfolio analysis. Results of the calendar month analysis show that the equally (value) weighted 
zero-investment portfolio that buys portfolio M1 and sells short portfolio M9 would gain 100 (90) 
basis points per month for a 12-month holding period.  
Since earnings management estimates are mandatory for our portfolio formation, the use 
of split events conducted before the release of annual reports would create a look-ahead bias in our 
results. So, to ensure that our proposed strategy is fully implementable and to avoid the look-ahead 
bias issue, we exclude all splits announced within several annual report release periods (45, 60, 
and 75 days after the fiscal year end). This filtration does not hinder the profitability of the calendar 
month trading strategy.  
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We interpret our findings as empirical evidence on the dual use of stock splits and earnings 
management as a signaling strategy. However, prior literature provides several alternative 
explanations to stock splits in addition to the signaling hypothesis. We conduct additional tests to 
rule out the possibility that splits identified as overoptimistic/opportunistic in this study are 
explained by changes in households’ ownership and/or institutional ownership, liquidity, and 
catering to investors’ desire to buy cheap stocks. Further, we show that CEOs who conduct these 
splits (splits identified as overoptimistic/opportunistic in this study) engage more in insider trading 
around split announcements, lending further support to the signaling explanation. 
To highlight the possibility of using our portfolio formation to better explain results in the 
prior literature, we replicate the test in Byun and Rozeff (2003), that shows that, during the 1991-
1996 period, long-term returns following stock splits are not significantly different from zero.3,4 
Our BHAR results during that period are similar to Byun and Rozeff (2003) for the overall stock 
split sample. However, when we use our portfolio ranking, we report statistically significant 
negative (positive) abnormal returns for portfolio M9 (all other splits). These results can help better 
explain the zero-abnormal return evidence reported in Byun and Rozeff (2003). 
Further, we conduct several tests to check the sensitivity of our results to factors that have 
been shown to impact long-term return predictability following stock splits. To check the impact 
of information asymmetry, we examine the profitability of our trading portfolio for subgroups of 
large and small firms. To check the impact of dividends, we test the profitability of our trading 
 
3 Required earnings management data is not available to replicate the sample period of FFJR (1969) or Desai and Jain 
(1997), who test long-term returns following stock split using 1927-1950 period and 1976-1991 period, respectively. 
We have earnings management data to test the results of Byun and Rozeff (2003) that abnormal returns are not 
significantly different from zero for splits announced during the 1991-1996 period. This test is reported in section 
4.2.5. 
4 Byun and Rozeff (2003) start their measurement after the split effective date instead of the split announcement date 
(Boehme and Danielson, 2007). 
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portfolio for subgroups of dividends payers, non-dividends payers, firms that simultaneously 
increase dividends and conduct a stock split, and firms that do not simultaneously increase 
dividends with stock splits. To check the impact of institutional ownership, we test the profitability 
of our trading portfolio for firms with high and low institutional ownership. Our results rule out 
the possibility that these factors drive abnormal returns results reported in this paper. Further 
analysis shows that the profitability of our proposed portfolio did not disappear after the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX). We also test the sensitivity of our results to alternative RAM mechanisms such 
as cutting discretionary expenses. Our results do not change when we use growth and performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals (Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh, 2016). Lastly, our results are robust 
for value and glamour stocks, and for subgroups of firms with different splitting factors (splits 
with a 2:1 factor vs. other splits). All our tests use variables that are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent levels; however, our results do not change when we use unwinsorized variables (Kraft, 
Leone, and Wasley, 2006; Kothari, Sabino, and Zach, 2005).  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. Our results contribute to the 
signaling literature by further investigating the practice of combining signals and tactics that 
managers might use to convey private information, or alternatively to deceive shareholders. To the 
best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical evidence that long-term returns 
following stock splits are systematically negative for an ex-ante identified group of firms. Our 
findings provide insights in explaining the contradicting findings in the literature about post-split 
return patterns. Further, this paper complements Louis and Robinson (2005) and contributes to the 
earnings management literature by showing that the duality of earnings management and stock 
split is not always a signal of managerial optimism but instead could reflect managerial over-
optimism and/or opportunism. The essence of our results is similar to Fuller (2003) who shows a 
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variation in dividend price reactions that is linked to characteristics of pre-announcement trading 
activity. Similarly, this paper shows a variation in stock split price reactions that is linked to 
characteristics of pre-split reported earnings.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review. Section 3 presents data and research methods. Section 4 presents analysis and results. 
Section 5 presents additional robustness tests, and section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature review  
Stock splits have always presented a challenge to the efficient-market hypothesis. If 
markets are not efficient concerning this basic event (that has minimal cash flow consequences), 
then the efficient-market hypothesis is even more questionable regarding more informative events 
such as earnings announcements and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The importance of stock 
splits resulted in a large stream of papers trying to understand the motives behind splits as well as 
the short-term and long-term market reaction to split announcements. This literature provides 
several explanations for stock splits; the optimal trading range hypothesis posits that a manager 
can conduct a split to lower a stock price to a preferable range (Lamoureux and Poon, 1987; 
Maloney and Mulherin, 1992; Dyl and Elliott, 2006). A manager can also conduct a split to boost 
stock liquidity (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996; Lin, Singh, and Yu, 2009). Further, the 
signaling hypothesis asserts that a manager can conduct a stock split to signal positive private 
information (Brennan and Copeland, 1998; Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; McNichols and Dravid, 
1990; Desai and Jain, 1997). The signaling hypothesis is consistent with the seminal work of FFJR 
(1969) who state that “a split, which implies an increased expected dividends, is a signal to the 
market that the company’s directors are confident that future earnings will be sufficient to maintain 
dividend payments at a higher level.”   
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More recently, several papers investigate the signaling hypothesis regarding stock splits 
when combined with earnings management, i.e., the dual signaling effect of a split and earnings 
management. For example, Louis and Robinson (2005) argue that managers can use accruals in 
conjunction with other positive signals, such as stock splits, to enhance the credibility of accruals 
as a means of signaling favorable private information. Inversely, Guo, Liu, and Song (2008) argue 
that managers combine the split signal and the earnings management signal to deceive investors 
before stock-financed acquisitions. The opportunistic use of stock splits (as described in Guo, Liu, 
and Song [2008]) is also consistent with the optimal trading range hypothesis. According to 
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984, henceforth, GMT), one of the main disadvantages of the 
optimal trading range hypothesis is that managers of some overvalued firms might split simply to 
obtain a temporary stock price increase and delay stock price correction.5  
These two explanations for the dual use of a split and earnings management are related to 
the two explanations for earnings management provided by the accounting literature. On one hand, 
managing earnings is usually perceived as opportunistic behavior aiming at misleading investors. 
Furthermore, there is consistent evidence of a negative relationship between pre-event 
discretionary accruals and post-event abnormal returns.6 On the other hand, other studies posit that 
managers sometimes use their reporting discretion to signal their private information 
(Subramanyam, 1996; and Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996). In that regard, Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) argue that most researchers test managerial reporting discretion in contexts in which 
managers are more likely to display opportunistic behavior. Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) also 
 
5 Devos, Elliott, and Warr (2015) also highlight the possible opportunistic use of stock splits. 
6 For example, for seasonal equity offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998b), management buyouts (Perry and 
Williams, 1994), initial public offerings (IPOs) (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a; and Shivakumar, 2000), stock-for-
stock mergers (Erickson and Wang, 1999; and Louis, 2004), repurchase announcements (Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008), 
and annual general meetings (Banko, et al., 2013). 
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recommend that researchers should take managers incentives into consideration when studying the 
opportunistic hypothesis versus the signaling hypothesis of managerial reporting discretion. 
As a result, the tactic of combining earnings management signals and split signals could be 
performed by several types of managers: first, optimistic managers, as described in Louis and 
Robinson (2005), who have positive private information and who split their stocks to support their 
accruals signal; second, opportunistic managers, as described in Guo, Liu, and Song (2008), who 
aggressively manage earnings for manipulative purposes and who split their stocks to support their 
false reporting signals; and third, overoptimistic managers, who would manipulate earnings to 
levels not warranted by their weak future earnings (Schrand and Zechman, 2012), but who would 
also split their stocks to convey “what they believe” to be favorable private information.  
We argue that differentiating between these groups of splits cannot be performed solely by 
observing pre-split discretionary accruals, which could be growth-triggered (Collins, Pungaliya, 
and Vijh, 2016) and/or associated with managerial optimism (Louis and Robinson, 2005). The use 
of RAM to complement accruals management might provide a differentiating factor between the 
abovementioned groups of stock splits. Although some optimistic managers could participate in 
either discretionary accruals management or RAM and thus leads to the weakening of their stand-
alone return predictability, the concurrent use of aggressive discretionary accruals and RAM is 
more likely to be associated with over-optimism and/or opportunism (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Hsieh, Bedard, and Johnstone, 2014). 
In the long run, actual private information is revealed to the market, and while optimistic 
splitters should experience positive returns, both opportunistic and overoptimistic splitters should 
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experience return reversals. Prior studies on return predictability following stock splits do not 
recognize the existence of opportunistic or overoptimistic splitters.7   
It is worth noting that the distinction between overoptimistic splits and opportunistic splits 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this study focuses on distinguishing between optimistic 
splits on one hand and overoptimistic/opportunistic splits on the other hand, and the possibility of 
using this distinction to predict long-term abnormal returns following stock splits. Further, this 
paper does not aim to test the accruals anomaly or the RAM anomaly per se. Instead, our results 
highlight the importance of taking managerial incentives into consideration when studying 
signaling hypotheses and/or managers’ use of combined signals.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data  
Our study starts with the entire sample of forward stock splits that took place during 1988–
2011 on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.8 Our sample includes stock splits conducted by ordinary 
stocks, so we exclude splits conducted by American depositary receipts (ADRs), real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), small business institute (SBIs), and closed-end funds. We retrieved 
stock returns data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and financial and 
accounting data from COMPUSTAT. Our final sample consists of 5,155 stock split events during 
the 1988–2011 period.9  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
7 See for example Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) and Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang (2015). 
8 Desai and Jain (1997) show that their results are not different between the sample of stock splits and the sample of 
large stock dividends. So we do not distinguish between these two groups in our study.  
9 Please notice that, in order for a stock split to be included in our final sample, data should be available to estimate 
both abnormal cash flows and discretionary accruals. This condition reduced the sample size from 11,427 to 5,155. 
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our final sample. Panel A reports the number of 
splits per year. Split events are well distributed over the sampling period; however, there are a 
relatively higher number of stock splits during bull periods such as the late 1990s. After the 
financial crisis of 2008, the number of splits significantly declined to less than 100 cases per year.10 
Minnick and Raman (2014) argue that this decline is significantly associated with a drop in 
household investors’ equity holdings. Further, Kisling and Barinka (2013) justify this decline with 
the fact that retail investors become less important to the investor base. Panel B categorizes split 
events by listing exchange. Around 40, 5, and 55 percent of splits are conducted by NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ listed firms, respectively. Panel C categorizes split events by splitting factor and 
shows that the overwhelming majority of firms use 1.5:1 to 2:1 splitting factors. Panel D reports 
the percentage of stock split firms that belong to each size and MTBV quintile. More than 60 
percent of stock splits are conducted by firms within the top two size and MTBV quintiles. These 
statistics are consistent with those of Desai and Jain (1997) and Byun and Rozeff (2003).  
3.2. Measuring discretionary accruals and real activities management 
Our methodology in estimating discretionary accruals is similar to that of Guo, Liu, and 
Song (2008). We first measure total accruals (T_ACR) using balance sheet and income statement 
variables as change in noncash current assets, minus changes in current liabilities excluding short-
term debt and taxes payable, minus depreciation. Then, we estimate discretionary accruals as the 
residual, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , from the modified version of Jones (1991) model as described in Dechow, Sloan, 
 
10 Both the economic and the statistical significance of our results do not change when excluding split cases conducted 
after 2008, these results are available upon request. 
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and Sweeney (1995).11 Specifically, for each calendar year and two-digit SIC-code, we estimate 
the following model: 
𝑇_𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 1 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ +  𝛽2 (∆ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
              where T_ACRi,t is the firm’s total accruals. 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the firm’s lagged total assets. 
ΔSALEi,t is the firm’s change in sales. ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶i,t is the firm’s change in accounts receivable. PPEi,t 
is the firm’s property, plant, and equipment. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a random error term. We follow the accounting 
literature in scaling all variables by lagged total assets. Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2016) assert 
that models based on Jones (1991) to estimate discretionary accruals are misspecified for quarterly 
data as they do not account for growth. Although we are using annual data, our descriptive statistics 
presented later show that our split portfolios have similar growth characteristics measured by 
market-to-book ratio. Further, because stocks in all our portfolios are split stocks, which have high 
growth (more than 70 percent are in the top two MTBV quintiles), the effect of growth on our 
portfolios is expected to be homogeneous, leaving our portfolio ranking unchanged. As an extra 
precaution, we replicate all our tests using growth and performance matched measures of 
discretionary accruals.12 Results using the growth/performance-adjusted discretionary accruals are 
similar to our reported results.13   
Roychowdhury (2006) shows that manipulative firms can use sales manipulation and/or 
discretionary expenses manipulation to manage earnings. While firms can manipulate sales 
through excessive discounts and lenient credit terms, they can manipulate discretionary expenses 
 
11 Guo, Liu, and Song (2008) used the original Jones (1991) model. The version of Jones (1991) model used here takes 
into account the possibility of managers’ earnings management through exercising their discretion over revenues. For 
more details, please see Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1995). 
12 For each firm/ year, we first estimate discretionary current accruals as the residual from the modified Jones (1991) 
model in equation (1). Then, within each year and 2-digit SIC-code, we form five quintile ranks based on sales growth 
and returns on assets (ROA), resulting in 25 unique portfolios within each year/industry. Adjusted discretionary 
accruals is then calculated as the difference between firm/year discretionary accruals and the median discretionary 
accruals of the performance/growth matched portfolio for the same year and industry. 
13 These results are available upon request. 
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through cutting research and development (R&D) costs; sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
costs; and/or advertising expenses. In this study we focus on RAM using sales manipulation.14 
Firms that give excessive discounts and/or lenient credit terms have unusually low cash flows from 
operations. We calculate abnormal cash flows as the residual, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , from the model of 
Roychowdhury (2006). Specifically, for each calendar year and two-digit SIC code, we estimate 
the following model, 
   CFOi,t =  α0 + α1(1/ TAi,t−1)  + 𝛽1SALEi,t +  𝛽2 ∆ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                         (2) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flows from operating activities, 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1  is the firm’s lagged total 
assets, 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the firm’s net sales, and ∆ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the firm’s change in sales. We follow the 
accounting literature in scaling all variables by lagged total assets. 
3.3. Portfolios formation 
The idea that the standalone estimates of pre-split discretionary accruals or RAM are not 
sufficient to fully differentiate between optimistic and opportunistic/overoptimistic managers is 
the core of our portfolio formation.15 This idea is based on prior literature that shows that, although 
standalone earnings management could be a positive signal (Louis and Robinson, 2005), 
combining accruals management and RAM has always been perceived as an aggressive strategy 
that has negative long-term consequences on firm value (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; and Kothari, 
Mizik, and Roychowdhury, 2012). This literature assumes that managers with strong incentives to 
aggressively inflate their earnings might find themselves constrained by the limited discretionary 
 
14 More recent accounting literature focuses on abnormal discretionary expenses as a less confounding measure of 
RAM; for this purpose, in a separate test we also add real activities management using discretionary expenses. Results 
are also consistent with our conjectures. When firms inflate their pre-split earnings using accruals and RAM using 
both sales manipulation and discretionary expenses manipulation, post-split long-term returns are significantly lower 
than those reported for firms that use less complex schemes, i.e., the higher the capacity of pre-split earnings 
management the lower the post-split returns. Results of this test are reported in the robustness section. 
15 The robustness of this idea is further tested on section 4.2.6.  
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accruals capacity; hence, those managers are expected to support their accruals management with 
real activities management. Similarly, Hsieh, Bedard, and Johnstone (2014) show that 
overconfident managers participate more in aggressive accruals and real activities management. 
Following this literature, we use pre-split accruals and RAM to disentangle optimistic splits and 
overoptimistic/opportunistic splits.  
To rank stock splits according to the degree of earnings management, we double sort based 
on pre-split discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flows terciles.16 We first create three RAM 
terciles, following the conjecture of Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari, Mizik, and 
Roychowdhury (2012), that RAM is more value-destroying than accruals management. Second, 
inside each RAM tercile, we rank firms based on discretionary accruals. However, ranking based 
on RAM is more linear than ranking based on discretionary accruals. With RAM, firms with the 
most positive (negative) abnormal cash flow are considered the less (most) likely to have managed 
earnings whereas with discretionary accruals, although the most suspicious earnings management is 
usually associated with positive discretionary accruals, both extremes are considered suspicious. So we 
assume that the most conservative stocks would be associated with around zero discretionary accruals and 
the least conservative stocks would be associated with high positive pre-split discretionary accruals. This 
ranking results in nine portfolios; M1: M9; where portfolio M1 includes firms in the bottom 
discretionary accruals and RAM terciles prior to a stock split, and portfolio M9, at the other 
extreme, includes firms in the top discretionary accruals and RAM terciles prior to a stock split. It 
is worth noting that our portfolio formation does not assume specific sequential use of earnings 
management methods (Zang, 2012). We report descriptive statistics for the nine portfolios M1: 
M9 in Table 2.  
 
16 Discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flows are measured for the calendar year preceding the stock split 
announcement year. 
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[Please insert Table 2 here] 
Statistics in Table 2 show that portfolios at the bottom of the earnings management ladder 
(M1:M3) are not significantly different from those at the top (M7:M9) with respect to size, growth, 
sales, pre-split returns, splitting factors, or split announcement returns. 17  Descriptive statistics 
show that portfolios at the top of the earnings management ladder (M7:M9) have relatively higher 
leverage and lower profitability (ROA) than those on the bottom of the earnings management 
ladder (M1:M3). So, even with aggressive earnings management, firms in portfolios M7:M9 could 
not match the genuinely high earnings reported by optimistic firms. Further, high leverage could 
partially explain management engagement in aggressive accounting tactics, possibly to meet 
certain earning targets.18 Further, the average pre-split price for stocks in portfolio M9 is $53.3, 
which is lower than the average pre-split price for stocks in portfolio M1, which is $60.5. This 
difference rules out the possibility that the return reversal following portfolio M9 splits is due to 
improved price informativeness, which might have been the case if portfolio M9 stocks have 
significantly higher pre-split prices (Chan et al. (2017)). Our main contribution is that portfolios 
at the two ends of the earnings management ladder have strikingly different post-split abnormal 
returns. Descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that, while portfolio M1 has a one-year buy-and-
hold positive abnormal return of 11.9 percent, portfolio M9 has a one-year buy-and-hold negative 
abnormal return of -7.1 percent.  
 
17 Please notice that the pattern in abnormal cash flows (Acfo) and discretionary accruals (Dacc) is there by design. 
Our methodology dictates that portfolio M1 for example has around zero discretionary accruals and positive abnormal 
cash flows. On the other extreme, portfolio M9 should have positive discretionary accruals and negative abnormal 
cash flows. 
18 Our later results (reported in Table 8 and discussed in section 4.2.4) lend some support to this assumption. 
Leverage is positively associated with the likelihood of conducting over-optimistic/opportunistic splits (portfolio M9 
splits). 
  
- 16 - 
 
Our untabulated Pearson correlation matrix shows a significant positive correlation between 
one-year post-split BHAR and abnormal cash flows one year before the split event.19 Firms that 
aggressively manage earnings using RAM experience lower post-split returns. The one-year post-
split BHAR is also negatively correlated with pre-split discretionary accruals, so managing 
accruals prior to stock splits also results in post-split return reversals. However, our later results 
show that the stand-alone return predictability of components of earnings management 
weakens/vanishes in the regression tests. Further, split announcement returns measured by the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR-1,+1) are not significantly correlated with pre-split earnings 
management using either discretionary accruals or RAM. 
4. Analysis and results 
4.1. Stock split announcement returns 
In this section, we test the link between pre-split earnings management and split 
announcement returns using both portfolio and regression analysis. If investors use earnings 
management estimates to assess the legitimacy of a stock split signal, then announcement returns 
should be asymmetrical among portfolios M1:M9. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) of firm i in the split announcement period as follows, 
CAR–k,+k = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡))
𝑡+𝑘
𝑡−𝑘 ,                                                     (3) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the stock i daily actual returns and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the daily expected returns of stock i 
calculated using the market model estimated over the six-month period that ends ten days before 
the split announcement day. Table 3 reports CARs for the nine portfolios as well as for the entire 
sample of stock splits. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
19 Pearson correlation coefficients table is available upon request. 
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For the entire split sample, the average CAR-1,+1 is 2.8 percent, which is significant at the 
1 percent level, while the average CAR-5,+5 is 3 percent, which is also significant at the 1 percent 
level. Our results show that CAR-k,+k is significantly positive for all nine portfolios. Buying stock 
splits one day before the split announcement day can achieve 180 to 330 basis points in abnormal 
returns over a three-day holding period. These results are similar to GMT (1984) and Louis and 
Robinson (2005) who report a three-day split announcement returns of 3.4 percent and 2.4 percent, 
respectively. According to GMT (1984), these strong positive announcement returns may act as a 
motive for overvalued firms to split their stocks without having any positive information to reveal. 
An interesting observation is that, within each RAM tercile, announcement returns are higher for 
the top discretionary accruals group.20 This result is consistent with Louis and Robinson (2005). 
Investors seem to perceive splits that are accompanied with high discretionary accruals as a signal 
of managerial optimism. However, these differences ultimately vanish in our regression tests. A 
possible explanation for this is the control for growth (MTBV), which might explain a significant 
part of the amount of firm’s current accruals (Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh, 2016). 
Results in Table 3 lend support to the idea that a positive split announcement’s abnormal 
returns are not related to pre-split earnings management. Investors do not recognize a firm that 
combines the split signal with aggressive earnings management signal as an overvalued firm. 
Instead, our results show that CARs are relatively higher for portfolio M9 (CAR -1,+1 = 3.3 percent) 
as compared to portfolio M1 (CAR -1,+1 = 1.9%), i.e., there is preliminary evidence that investors 
possibly associate these splits with managerial optimism. To formally test the relation between 
pre-split earnings management and split announcement returns, we run the following model, 
 
20 For example, among portfolios M1:M3, portfolio M3 has the highest announcement returns. Similarly, among 
portfolios M4:M6, portfolio M6 has the highest announcement returns, and among portfolios M7:M9, portfolio M9 
has the highest announcement returns. 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−𝑘,+𝑘  = ∝  + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑀1 − 𝑀9 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
(4)       
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−𝑘,+𝑘 is stock split announcement cumulative abnormal returns. In Table 4, 
in specifications (1) and (2), the dependent variable is CAR-1,+1, in specifications (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is CAR-3,+3, and in specifications (5) and (6), the dependent variable is CAR-
5,+5. To account for the possible momentum impact of the pre-split price run-up, we control for 
Pre-split_returnsi, which is the raw stock returns during the 12-month period prior to the split 
announcement month, following GMT (1984). To account for the impact of information 
asymmetry on a split announcement return, we control for Sizei, which is the decile rank based on 
total assets. MTBVi is the decile rank based on market-to-book value. We control for Split_pricei 
which is the price on the day immediately following the day on which the split becomes effective, 
to account for market reaction to specific price range (Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt, 1999). 
Leveragei is the ratio of long-term debts to total assets. We control for Splitting factori, which is 
the stock split factor, to account for the possibility that some managers use splitting factors to 
signal their private information.21 Acfoi is the pre-split estimate of abnormal cash flows. Dacci is 
the pre-split estimate of discretionary accruals. Portfolio_M1-M9 is a dummy variable that equals 
to “1” if the firm belongs to portfolio M1, and “0” if it belongs to portfolio M9. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates of the split announcement return regressions. While 
there is a negative association between abnormal cash flow (Acfoi) and split announcement return, 
discretionary accruals (Dacci) are not significantly related to split announcement CARs. This result 
is in contrast to Louis and Robinson (2005) who show a positive association between pre-split 
 
21 Controlling for split factor accounts for argument of Baixauli (2007) that split abnormal announcement returns are 
reported only when split factor is greater than two. 
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accruals and announcement return. One possible explanation is that we use annual estimates of 
discretionary accruals for the period 1988–2011 whereas they use quarterly estimates for the period 
1990-2002, which are misspecified particularly for high-growth split firms, according to Collins, 
Pungaliya, and Vijh (2016). In Table 4, columns 2, 4, and 6, we report results for specifications 
comparing the two extreme earnings management portfolios (including a dummy variable 
Portfolio_M1-M9, hence using around 20 percent of the sample). These results also do not show 
any significant relation between pre-split earnings management and split announcement returns. 
Investors seem to react more positively to splits announced by small (Size) and value stocks 
(MTBV). Announcement returns are positively related to splitting factors. This finding is consistent 
with McNichols and Dravid (1990) who assert that investors seem to perceive splitting factors as 
a signal of the nature of managers’ private information. 
Results in this section show that investors do not use pre-split earnings management 
estimates to assess stock split announcements. Because the majority of stock splits are believed to 
be conducted by firms with good earnings potential, investors seem to naively consider that all 
stock splitters are undervalued. By doing so, investors push some “already overvalued” stocks to 
deviate even more from their fundamental values. These results are consistent with Bardos, Golec, 
and Harding (2011) who show that investors are misled by inflated earnings at the time of the 
announcement and react positively to the component of the favorable earnings surprise, which will 
subsequently be restated. Similarly, our results indicate that, for some splits, investors are misled 
by pre-split earnings management and react positively to false splits, which will subsequently be 
followed by return reversals.  
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4.2. Long-term abnormal returns following stock splits 
Literature on measuring long-term abnormal returns proposes two broad methodologies: 
buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and calendar-time portfolio. On the one hand, Lyon, 
Barber, and Tsai (1999) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) prefer the BHAR methodology. On the 
other hand, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) strongly favor the calendar-time 
portfolio approach. In this study, we investigate long-term returns of our portfolios using both 
methodologies.22  
4.2.1. Buy and hold abnormal returns 
In this section, we investigate long-term returns of our portfolios using the BHAR method. 
We calculate the one-year post-split BHAR as follows:  
                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  ∏ [ 1 +  𝑅𝑖,𝑡] – ∏  [ 1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)]
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,                                (5) 
where Ri,t is the actual return of stock i on month t and E(Ri,t) is the expected return for security i 
on month t. Expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is measured as the return for size and book-to-market matched 
portfolios. To form reference portfolios, we first assign split firms to size and book-to-market 
quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints.23 Then we compare the stock price performance of split 
firms to 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market quintiles using NYSE breakpoints (Fama 
and French, 1992 and 1993). 24 Stock splits usually follow unusually high price run-ups (Byun and 
Rozeff, 2003); therefore, many stock splits could be significantly driven by market-wide and/or 
industry-wide movements.25 To account for the possibility that post-split returns are driven by the 
 
22 To eliminate the effect of split announcement returns, our window for measuring long-term returns starts with the 
split effective date instead of the split announcement date. 
23 Following Fama and French (1997) we calculate book equity as total shareholders’ equity, minus preferred stocks 
(when available), plus deferred taxes (when available), plus investment tax credit (when available), plus post-
retirement benefit liabilities (when available). Book-to-market equity is calculated as the ratio of fiscal year end book 
equity divided by market capitalization of common stock at calendar year end. 
24 Similar results are acquired using the S&P500 composite index and also the Fama-French 48 industry returns. 
25 For example, as shown in Table 1, good market years like 1998 have a high number of stock splits. 
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persistence or reversal of such movements, we report results using two additional proxies for 
expected returns: returns for the S&P500 composite index and the Fama-French 48 industry 
returns.26   
 Table 5 presents the BHAR for each of the nine portfolios as well as the return differential 
between portfolios M1 and M9.27 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
Results reported in Table 5 show that post-split returns are negatively associated with pre-
split earnings management. The one-year BHAR using size and book-to-market reference 
portfolios (BHARref) for portfolio M1 is 5.5 percent. This high and positive return is in stark 
contrast to portfolio M9 which has a BHARref of -16 percent. BHARref is positive and significant 
for portfolios M1-M3, is not significantly different from zero for portfolios M4-M6, and is 
significantly negative for portfolios M7-M9.  
Tests using market returns (BHARsp500) and firm-specific industry returns (BHARind) as 
proxies for expected returns yield similar results. The average one-year BHARsp500 is 11.9 percent 
for portfolio M1 and is significantly negative at -7.1 percent for portfolio M9. BHARind is 5.5 
percent for portfolio M1 and is significantly negative at -5.8 percent for portfolio M9. Our results 
show that the industry-adjusted measure, BHARind, is the most conservative measure of abnormal 
returns. This result is consistent with the notion that returns around stock splits could be 
significantly driven by industry-wide trends. These results show that neither size and book-to-
market reference portfolios nor market returns or industry returns explain the significantly large 
difference in post-split returns between portfolios M1 and M9. 
 
26 Industry-adjusted buy and hold abnormal return is calculated by subtracting from the split firm return the average 
return for the associated Fama-French 48 industry.  
27  In a separate test, we also measure return differentials between portfolios with higher degrees of earnings 
management and portfolio M9; results of these tests are available upon request. 
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4.2.2. Regression analysis 
 In this section, we investigate the long-term returns of portfolio M1 (supposedly, optimistic 
splits) and portfolio M9 (supposedly, overoptimistic/opportunistic splits), using the regression 
method. We estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression of post-split long-term 
returns: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 =∝  +𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑀1 − 𝑀9 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(6) 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the post-split one-year BHAR. BHARref is used in 
specifications (1) and (2), BHARsp500 is used in specifications (3) and (4), and BHARind is used in 
specifications (5) and (6). Since under-reaction is expected to be more prominent for smaller firms 
with higher information asymmetry, we control for firm Size. To control for the impact of firm 
growth on long-term performance, we control for MTBV. To control for the possibility of 
managers’ use of splitting factors to signal their long-term expectations, we control for splitting 
factor. Control variables are defined in the manner explained earlier. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
Coefficient estimates in columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 6 show that investigating pre-split 
earnings management can help predict future returns. The average return differential between 
portfolio M1 and portfolio M9 (coefficient estimate of portfolio M1-M9) ranges between 4.4 
percent and 10 percent after controlling for size, growth, momentum, split price, leverage, and 
splitting factor. Coefficients of pre-split_returns show that the higher the price run-up prior to the 
split announcement, the lower the post-split returns. Post-split returns are higher for firms with 
high growth opportunities, where the coefficients of MTBV in Table 6 are positive and significant 
at the 1 percent level. Splitting factor does not seem to provide any predictive power for post-split 
  
- 23 - 
 
long-term abnormal returns. Because we do not assume linear relations neither between 
discretionary accruals on their own nor abnormal cash flows on their own and long-term returns, 
insignificant coefficients of Acfo and Dacc are not surprising. This result is consistent with Kothari, 
Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2012) who find evidence of long-term consistent negative returns 
associated with firms that concurrently manage earnings using both accruals and RAM during the 
pre-SEO periods.  
4.2.3. Calendar time portfolios 
In this section, we estimate the monthly returns of a zero-investment portfolio that buys 
portfolio M1 and sells portfolio M9 short. We use the calendar-time methodology to compute 
average monthly returns of a portfolio of stocks formed at the end of each month. To adjust returns 
for risk exposure and stock characteristics, we estimate intercepts from the four-factor model that 
includes the Fama-French (1993) factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor as follows:28,29 
                    𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡,                       (7) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the monthly return of our calendar month portfolio at month t, 𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑡is the month t 
value-weighted market return minus the risk-free rate, and the terms 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  (small minus big), 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low), and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡 are the month t returns on the zero-investment factor-
mimicking portfolios designed to capture size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, 
respectively. Table 7 reports the estimated intercepts (Alphas) from the four-factor model. 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
Results reported in panel A of Table 7 (column 1) show that, after controlling for risk 
factors and momentum, the equally (value) weighted zero-investment portfolio that buys M1 
 
28 Fama-French (1993) three factor-model alphas are separately estimated. These results are available upon request. 
29 Stock splits usually follow periods of exceptionally high stock returns. The Carhart (1997) momentum factor has 
been added to take into consideration the possibility of the persistence of pre-split good returns.  
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stocks and sells short M9 stocks would gain 100 (90) basis points per month for a 12-month 
holding period. Results for 24- and 36-month portfolios (columns 2 and 3) indicate that most of 
the reported abnormal returns are achieved within the first 12 months following the split 
announcement month. These results lend support to our earlier BHAR results. However, 
implementing this trading strategy depends primarily on the availability of earnings management 
estimates before the split announcement date. So any stock split announced before the release of a 
firm’s annual report cannot be a part of this trading strategy. Otherwise, our results might suffer 
from a look-ahead bias. 
Although most firms file their annual reports within 45 days of the fiscal year end, the 
federal securities laws require large accelerated filers, accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers 
to file form 10-k no later than within 60, 75, and 90 days of the fiscal year end, respectively.30 To 
insure the full implementation of our proposed trading strategy, we report alphas for the zero-
investment portfolios that exclude splits announced within 45, 60, and 75 days of the fiscal year 
end, respectively.31 Results reported in panels B through D of Table 7 confirm that the trading 
strategy proposed in this paper is implementable and ensures that the calendar month portfolio 
results are not disrupted by a look-ahead bias. Excluding split announcements within 45 days or 
60 days of the fiscal year end does not hinder the profitability of the calendar month zero-
investment portfolio. A 12-month zero-investment portfolio that buys M1 stocks and sells short 
M9 stocks would gain an average of 90 basis points per month. We note that this positive return is 
mostly due to the large and significant positive returns of M1 stocks. Therefore, short selling 
constraints would not impair the profitability of this trading strategy. It is worth noting that, 
 
30 Please see more details on http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm   
31 The overwhelming majority of stock split firms are classified as large accelerated filers (please see Tables 1 and 2). 
We also report results excluding splits announced within 75 days of fiscal year end as an extra caution. 
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although this zero-investment portfolio is constructed using the top and bottom earnings 
management portfolios (a total of 1,059 stock splits), statistically significant results (economically 
less significant though) are acquired when using the top and bottom three earnings management 
portfolios (a total of 3,434 stock splits). Further, given that CRSP dataset has over 20,000 unique 
stock split announcements, the top and bottom portfolios in that population are consisting of a 
reasonably large number of events. 
Figure 1 provides a graphic depiction of the performance of portfolios M1 and M9. This 
figure presents the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the 24-month period 
following the split announcement month (month “0”).  
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows a divergence between portfolios M1 and M9 that happens around the sixth 
month following the split announcement. During the 24-month post-split period, portfolio M1 
experiences a 20 percent positive CAR, whereas portfolio M9 experiences a -21 percent CAR 
during the same period. Calendar month portfolio results reported in this section show that this 
divergence could be translated into a profitable and fully implementable trading strategy.  
In summary, regression as well as portfolio analysis provide evidence that the market 
underreacts to stock splits in portfolio M1 (supposedly, optimistic splits). Markets, on the other 
hand, overreact to stock splits in portfolio M9 (supposedly, overoptimistic/opportunistic splits). 
4.2.4. Stock splits: alternative explanations 
 The main idea of this paper is that some managers (splitters in portfolio M9) combine 
earnings management and splits for signaling purposes. However, signaling is just one reason to 
conduct a stock split. The literature provides several alternative explanations such as boosting 
liquidity, changes in household and institutional ownership, and catering (Minnick and Raman 
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(2014)). In this section, we test the possibility that portfolio M9 splits are motivated by these 
alternative hypotheses.  
First, we investigate the possibility that portfolio M9 splits are explained by the drop in 
households’ ownership (the increase in institutional ownership). 32  If portfolio M9 is a mere 
reflection of poor (good) governance and/or the increase (decline) in stock splits occurrences 
associated with increasing households’ (institutional) equity ownership, then we would expect a 
significant association between the likelihood of these splits and households’ and/or institutional 
equity ownership. We define aggregate households’ ownership as the total equity holdings owned 
by U.S. households. We proxy for the aggregate level of institutional ownership by the equity 
ownership of U.S. domestic financial institutions.33 We also control for firm-level institutional 
ownership.34 Second, we investigate the possibility that portfolio M9 splits are explained by firms 
desire to boost stock liquidity. We use the decimalization in 2001 as an exogenous shock to stock 
liquidity to test this hypothesis. If liquidity explains splits in portfolio M9, then these splits should 
experience a much larger decline, as compared to other splits, in the post-2001 period.  
Next, we investigate the possibility that portfolio M9 splits are explained by the catering 
hypothesis. Minnick and Raman (2014) show that the catering premium has declined from 1983 
to 2009. If splits in portfolio M9 are motivated by firms’ desire to cater to investors’ demand for 
cheaper stocks, then the likelihood for these splits are expected to observe a larger decline over 
the sampling period as compared to other splits. Lastly, we further investigate our conjecture that 
portfolio M9 splits are best described by the signaling hypothesis. Our signaling assumptions posit 
 
32 An earlier work by Mukherji, Kim, and Walker (1997) shows that, although stock splits increase number of both 
individual and institutional shareholders, the percentage of equity held by institutions does not change significantly 
following a stock split.  
33 Data for the aggregate levels of ownership are acquired from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Z.1. Flow of 
funds (annual) accounts, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1. Households’ ownership is FL153064105, and 
U.S. domestic financial sector ownership is FL793064105.  
34 Firm-level institutional ownership data are acquired from Thomson Reuters. 
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that portfolio M9 includes opportunistic split in addition to overoptimistic ones. Opportunistic 
splitters, who are aware that their stocks are over-valued, are expected to try to reap personal 
benefits before a market correction takes place. In that context, a split can be seen as a false signal 
to delay such correction (Guo, Liu, and Song [2008]). In order to further investigate this conjecture, 
we test CEOs trading behavior around split announcements. Results of testing the abovementioned 
alternative hypotheses are presented in Table 8. 
[Please insert Table 8 here] 
The dependent variable in all of the logistic regression models in Table 8 is a dummy 
variable that equals to “1” if a split belongs to portfolio M9 and “0” otherwise. Specification (1) 
tests the liquidity hypothesis. To capture the 2001 decimalization liquidity shock, we control for 
Post-2001, which is a dummy variable that equals to “1” for the years after 2001. The coefficient 
estimate of Post-2001 is not statistically significant, which rules out the possibility that M9 splits 
are conducted by firms with a desire to improve stock liquidity. Specification (2) in Table 8 tests 
the possible impact of households’ and institutional ownership. The coefficient estimates of 
household ownership (Agg_household), and institutional ownership (both on the aggregate-level, 
Agg_institutional, and on the firm-level, Inst_ownership) are not statistically different from zero.  
Specification (3) in Table 8 tests the catering hypothesis. Catering is an ordinal variable 
that equals to “1” for the first year in our sample (1988). This variable captures the gradual decline 
of the catering premium over the sample period. The coefficient estimate of Catering is negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that the likelihood of portfolio M9 splits has declined over 
the overall sampling period. However, in specification (5), at which we also control for Post_2001, 
the coefficient estimate of Catering is not statistically significant. So, the decline, which is 
insignificant though, in the likelihood of portfolio M9 splits is probably more associated with the 
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enhancing governance and manipulation detection following the SOX and/or tick size change of 
2001 instead of with the gradual decline in the catering premium (Minnick and Raman, 2014) or 
the clientele effect (Lipson and Mortal, 2006). In specification (4) in Table 8, we investigate the 
false signal (opportunism) hypothesis by controlling for insider trading. Net_insider_trading is the 
difference between numbers of a CEO’s buy-and-sell transactions conducted during the six months 
window around the split announcement date (i.e., Net-buyers (Net-sellers) have positive (negative) 
values of Net_insider_trading). The coefficient estimate of Net_insider_trading is significantly 
negative at the 10 percent level, indicating that net-sellers are more likely to conduct portfolio M9 
splits. Our untabulated results show that most of this insider trading happens in the pre-split period, 
which rules out the possibility that it is driven by the improvement in informed trading following 
stock split events (Chan et al. [2017]).  It is worth noting that this evidence is expected to be much 
stronger if one distinguishes between opportunistic and overoptimistic splits in portfolio M9. 
However, as we mentioned earlier, this distinction falls beyond the scope of this paper. Results in 
specification (5) in Table 8 lend further support to our signaling explanation. The coefficient 
estimates on factors that capture households’ ownership, institutional ownership, liquidity, and 
catering alternative hypotheses are not statistically significant. However, the coefficient estimate 
of Net_insider_trading is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These results are consistent 
with our conjecture that portfolio M9 is more likely to include firms that combine a split and 
earnings management for signaling purposes. 
In the next three sections, we investigate three ideas that are essential to the interpretation 
of our results. First, we argue that the portfolio formation proposed in this paper can help explain 
some results in the prior literature. To test this conjecture, we investigate the persistence of our 
results in a subsample investigated in Byun and Rozeff (2003). Second, the portfolio formation 
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proposed in this paper is based on the idea that the concurrent use of earnings management 
estimates is superior to the stand-alone use of separate estimates. We test this conjecture by 
investigating the stand-alone return predictability of earnings management estimates. Third, and 
most important, our interpretation of the dual use of the split signal and the earnings management 
signal is based on the notion that the split has an additional mispricing impact on top of that of 
earnings management. To further investigate this conjecture, we try to separate the price impact of 
the split signal from that of the earnings management signal. 
4.2.5. Optimistic vs. overoptimistic/opportunistic splits in prior literature 
We argue that extant studies of long-term returns following stock splits do not differentiate 
between optimistic splits and overoptimistic/opportunistic splits. The results reported in this paper 
are not unique to our sample. Instead, similar portfolio formation can be conducted to better 
explain results in prior studies. We replicate one of the tests in Byun and Rozeff (2003) who show 
that, during the 1991–1996 period, post-split abnormal returns are not significantly different from 
zero. 35  Our untabulated results show that, during 1991–1996, abnormal returns are not 
significantly different from zero for the entire sample of stock splits. However, when using the 
portfolio formation proposed in this study, we report significantly different returns for the portfolio 
M9 versus other stock splits. On one hand, portfolio M9 has an average one-year BHARref of -9.6 
percent. On the other hand, all other splits have a 2.4 percent positive abnormal return during the 
same period. These results do not imply that Byun and Rozeff (2003) results were inaccurate. On 
the contrary, for the overall sample of splits, our results are consistent with theirs. However, this 
result suggests that estimates of earnings management might be an omitted variable in studying 
long-term returns following stock splits. 
 
35 We do not have data for earnings management to replicate FFJR (1969) or Desai and Jain (1997), who test splits 
during 1927-1950 and 1976-1991, respectively. 
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4.2.6. Standalone return predictability of earnings management estimates.  
Our portfolio formation is based on the idea that the concurrent use of earnings 
management estimates is superior to the standalone use of separate estimates. To investigate the 
standalone return predictability of the pre-split discretionary accruals and RAM, we calculate the 
one-year post-split BHAR for different portfolios based on pre-split discretionary accruals and 
RAM, separately. For the purpose of completeness, we report results for three distinct earnings 
management portfolio rankings: tercile, quintile, and decile portfolios, respectively. However, to 
facilitate comparison with our baseline results, we focus our discussion on tercile ranking 
portfolios. High refers to firms with the most aggressive pre-split accruals management (RAM), 
consisting of splits in portfolio with the highest income increasing discretionary accruals (lowest 
abnormal cash flows). Low refers to firms with the least aggressive pre-split accruals management 
(RAM), consisting of splits in portfolio with the non-income-increasing/non-income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals (highest abnormal cash flows). The results of this test are reported in Table 
9.  
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
Panel A of Table 9 reports BHARref for the top and the bottom earnings management 
portfolios. For the discretionary accruals tercile ranking portfolios, one-year BHARref of the most 
(least) aggressive portfolio is -7 percent (1 percent).The difference between BHARref of these two 
portfolios is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We replicate the sub-periods of Green, 
Hand, and Soliman (2011), prior to 1996, 1997-2003, and 2004-2010, respectively. Our return 
differential results show that the accruals anomaly is persistent regarding stock splits. The 
difference in BHARref between the most and the least aggressive accruals management splits 
ranges between 6 percent and 8 percent, which is statistically significant during the three sub–
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periods. These results (using tercile ranking) contrast the findings of Green, Hand, and Soliman 
(2011) who show that the accruals anomaly does not exist in the later sub-period. Louis and 
Robinson’s (2005) explain this contradiction by pointing out that some managers try to combine 
accruals management with the split event to benefit from investors’ positive reaction to this 
double-signaling tactic. This tactic could be fully legitimate for some managers; however, it could 
be an act of over-optimism or opportunism for others. Consequently, estimates of discretionary 
accruals surrounding stock splits could be, on average, more informative than those for the overall 
sample of stocks. It is worth noting that using quintile and/or decile rankings gives some support 
to the idea that the accruals anomaly vanishes in later periods (return differential is not statistically 
significant in the 2004-2010 sub-period). Much weaker results are reported for RAM tercile-
ranking portfolios. The one-year BHARref of the most (least) aggressive portfolio is -9 percent (-3 
percent). The difference between BHARref of these two portfolios is significant at the 1 percent 
level only for the overall sample of splits. However, the difference in BHARref between the most 
and the least aggressive RAM splits is not statistically significant during two of the three tested 
sub-periods (pre-1996 and 2004-2010). 
To formally test the standalone return predictability of pre-split discretionary accruals and 
RAM, we run the following model: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 =∝  +𝛽1𝐸𝑀_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦+ 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀, 
(8) 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the post-split one-year BHARref. In each 
specification, 𝐸𝑀_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 is a binary variable that takes the value of “1” if the firm belongs to 
the most aggressive earnings management portfolio, and “0” if it belongs to the least aggressive 
one. Specifications (1), (2), and (3) use splits on the top and bottom portfolios based on 
  
- 32 - 
 
discretionary accruals with tercile, quintile, and decile ranking, respectively. Specifications (4), 
(5), and (6) use splits on the top and bottom portfolios based on RAM tercile, quintile, and decile 
ranking, respectively. Control variables are defined in the manner explained earlier. Results of 
OLS regression are reported in panel B of Table 9. Results on specifications (1) – (3) lend further 
support to the idea that discretionary accruals could aid post-split return predictability. For 
specifications (1) – (3), the coefficients of the EM_dummy is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. However, the return differential based on discretionary accruals ranking is economically 
much smaller than that reported based on our ranking which uses both accruals and RAM. Further, 
results on specifications (4) – (6), show that the return predictability of the RAM vanishes on the 
regression test. A possible explanation for this finding is that overoptimistic and/or opportunistic 
splitters might use RAM only as a supporting tool for accruals management instead of as a stand-
alone method. Consequently, the use of RAM by overoptimistic/opportunistic splitters cannot be 
fully understood without studying its concurrent use side by side with accruals management. 36  
4.2.7. The separate signal of stock splits and earnings management 
The dual use of split and earnings management as a false signal (as described in Guo, Liu, 
and Song (2008) and by portfolio M9 in this paper) is based on the notion that, when conducted 
by overoptimistic/opportunistic managers, a split has an additional signaling impact on top of the 
earnings management impact. To further investigate this conjecture, we try to separate the price 
impact of the split signal from that of the pre-split earnings management signal. Specifically, we 
compare long-term abnormal returns of a treatment group consisting of firms that conduct stock 
splits preceded by both aggressive accruals and RAM with those of a control group consisting of 
matched non-split firms with similar levels of earnings management.  
 
36  See among others: Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard (1991), Bushee (1998), Dechow and Skinner (2000), and 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
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Our treatment group (Aggressive_Splits) consists of firms that conduct stock splits 
preceded by aggressive accruals and RAM. We begin with the entire set of stock splits during 
1988–2011 that has Compustat data available. Following Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury 
(2012), we define “treatment firms” as split firms that have a one-year pre-split positive 
discretionary accruals and negative abnormal operating cash flows. This procedure results in 724 
stock splits. We match each (Aggressive_Split) with a (Aggressive_Non_Split) based on size, 
MTBV, a two-digit SIC-code, year, discretionary accruals, and abnormal cash flows.37  
[Please insert Table 10 here] 
Results reported in panel A of Table 10 show that the treatment group (Aggressive_Splits) 
has negative one-year BHARref of -15.6 percent. This figure is significantly lower than the -9.6 
percent reported for the control group (Aggressive_Non_Splits). Similar albeit less significant 
results are reported when using S&P 500 and Fama-French industry returns as expected returns. 
The BHARsp500 (BHARind) for Aggressive_Splits is 7.9 percent (4 percent) lower than that of 
Aggressive_Non_Splits. 
The difference in returns between Aggressive_Splits and Aggressive_Non_Splits captures 
the mispricing impact of stock split announcements. Our explanation of the dual signaling 
hypothesis would not be plausible if the post-split negative returns are fully explained by accruals 
and RAM. To formally test this conjecture, we run the following model, 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐴𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,                                                        (9)  
 
37 The matched control firm’s size decile, MTBV decile, two-digit SIC-code, and year should be equal to those of the 
treatment firm. Further, the matched control firm’s discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flows should be within 
70 percent and 130 percent of those of the treatment firm. Our final treatment and control samples comprise 716 pairs 
of Aggressive_Splits  and Aggressive_Non_Splits. 
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where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the post-split one-year BHAR. BHARref is used in 
specifications (1) and (2), BHARsp500 is used in specifications (3) and (4), and BHARind is used in 
specifications (5) and (6). Aggressive_Splitter is a dummy variable that equals to “1” if the firm 
belongs to the treatment group (Aggressive_Splits) and “0” if it belongs to the control group 
(Aggressive_Non_Splits). Control variables are defined as explained earlier. 
Regression results reported in panel B of Table 10 are consistent with the univariate test. 
Coefficients of the splitter dummy indicate that one-year post-split abnormal returns of 
Aggressive_Splits are significantly lower than those of Aggressive_Non_Splits. This difference in 
returns (which supposedly captures the stock split mispricing impact) is robust to using different 
measures of abnormal returns and to controlling for size, BTMV, momentum, leverage, accruals, 
and real activities management.  
5. Additional robustness tests 
5.1. Earnings management through cutting discretionary expenses 
The idea that the more aggressive the pre-split earnings management, the more likely the 
split is classified as overoptimistic/opportunistic is key to our findings. So far, we present results 
that support this idea using two forms of earnings management: discretionary accruals and real 
activities management using sales manipulation. We test the robustness of this idea further by 
adding another layer of earnings management: RAM through cutting discretionary expenses. Our 
arguments would assume that firms that concurrently participate in the three forms of earnings 
management should experience significantly lower post-split returns than firms with lower degree 
of pre-split earnings management. 
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Managing earnings by reducing R&D expenses has received special attention in the 
literature.38 Roychowdhury (2006) defines discretionary expenses as the sum of R&D expenses, 
advertising expenses, and sales, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses. He argues that 
managers could reduce such expenses to achieve certain earnings targets. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), for each calendar year and two-digit SIC-code, we estimate the following 
model, 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 ( 1 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) +  𝛽 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                      (11)                  
where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡  is discretionary expenses for the year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the year. 𝑇𝐴𝑡−1  is lagged total assets. 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  is lagged sales scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. For every firm-year, abnormal discretionary expenses is the actual DISEXP 
minus the “normal” DISEXP, calculated using estimated coefficients from the corresponding 
industry-year model. In addition to our nine regular earnings management portfolios, our results 
(untabulated) present abnormal returns for portfolio M10, consisting of firms with an evidence of 
aggressive accruals and RAM using both sales and discretionary expenses manipulation. These 
results lend further support to our conjectures. The BHARref for portfolio M10 is -22 percent 
compared to 5.5 percent (-16 percent) for portfolio M1 (M9). The same results are reported using 
the other proxies for abnormal returns, BHARsp500 and BHARind. These results show that the higher 
the degree of the pre-split earnings management, the lower the post-split abnormal returns. In 
general, these results are consistent with the earnings management literature regarding the effect 
of earnings management aggressiveness on long-term returns.39 Our results show that the most 
 
38 See for example, Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard (1991), and Bushee (1998). 
39 Teoh, Welch, and Wang (1998b) show that the worst post seasonal equity offerings (SEO) performance is reported 
for issuers with an unusually large income-increasing accounting adjustment prior to the offering. Teoh, Welch, and 
Wang (1998a) document that IPO issuers in the most aggressive quartile of earnings management have 20 percent 
lower three-year abnormal returns than IPO issuers in the most conservative quartile. Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) 
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prominent negative (positive) post-split abnormal returns are reported for firms with the highest 
(lowest) degree of pre-split earnings management. 
5.2. Long-term returns following stock splits in the prior literature 
In this section, we investigate a number of arguments presented in the stock split literature. 
We test the profitability of portfolio M1-M9 in relation to dividends, size, growth, splitting factors, 
time, and institutional ownership.  
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) argue that markets react positively to the dividends 
increase associated with stock splits, and when controlling for such dividends component, they do 
not find any informational content in stock splits. To show that our results are not presumed by 
dividends, we present our results in relation to dividends payment and change. The results in panels 
A and B of Table 11 show that the market underreacts (overreacts) to portfolio M1 (portfolio M9) 
regardless of whether the firm pays/simultaneously increases dividends or not, indicating that 
earnings management is not a mere reflection of dividends payment or change.  
[Please insert Table 11 here] 
Less information is available for small stocks. As a result, under-reaction is expected to be 
more prominent for smaller firms (Atiase, 1985; Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990; and Desai and 
Jain, 1997). Following the same intuition, we project that the overreaction to splits conducted by 
firms in portfolio M9 should also be more severe for smaller stocks. The results in panel C of Table 
11 are consistent with this assumption. Among portfolio M9 stocks, smaller firms have a one-year 
BHARref of -19 percent as compared to -14 percent for larger firms. 
 
show that the negative association between pre-repurchase discretionary accruals and post-repurchase abnormal 
returns is largely driven by firms reporting the largest income-decreasing abnormal accruals. Further, Allen, Larson, 
and Sloan (2013) show that extreme accruals exhibit a high frequency of subsequent reversals that predict future 
accruals, earnings, and stock returns. 
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Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishney (1994) show that value 
stocks outperform glamour stocks. Inversely, Desai and Jain (1997) show that value stocks 
underperform glamour stocks for stock splits. The results reported in panel D of Table 11 show 
that, for portfolio M1, the one-year BHARref is -2.3 percent (9.4 percent) for value (glamour) stocks. 
For portfolio M9, the one-year BHARref is -22 percent (-12 percent) for value (glamour) stocks. 
These results are similar to Desai and Jain (1997), indicating that, for stock splits, value stocks 
underperform glamour stocks. 
McNichols and Dravid (1990) assert that the splitting factor is a self-selection decision 
made by managers in order to signal their private information. Our results in panel E of Table 11 
do not show any clear relation between the profitability of the earnings management portfolio and 
splitting factors. This result is consistent with Desai and Jain (1997) and also with our regression 
analysis results. Further, Chen and Huang (2013) argue that the accruals anomaly regarding open-
market repurchases has vanished after the SOX. Courteau, Kao, and Tian (2015) show that SOX 
has prompted firms to favor real activities manipulation over accruals manipulation. To examine 
whether our results are affected by SOX, we report abnormal returns for two sub–periods, 1988-
1999 and 2000-2011 in panel F of Table 11. The profitability of the earnings management portfolio 
M1-M9 is statistically and economically significant in both periods, with evidence of increase 
towards the second half of our sample period.  
Last firms with high institutional ownership are expected to have better governance than 
those with low institutional ownership. Panel G in Table 11 reports BHARref  of splits conducted 
by firms with high (above median) and low (below median) levels of institutional ownership. For 
firms with high institutional ownership, portfolio M9 has an average BHARref of -5.6, which is less 
negative than firms with low institutional ownership, which has an average BHARref of -8.4 percent. 
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This difference could be explained by the role that institutions are playing to reduce managers’ 
discretion in adopting aggressive earnings management tactics. However, the return differential 
between portfolio M1 and portfolio M9 for both high and low institutional ownership firms is very 
similar (around -21 percent), and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In summary, 
results in this section show that profitability of the earnings management portfolios of stock splits 
is robust in relation to size, growth, dividends, splitting factors, time, and institutional ownership. 
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6. Conclusion 
Extant literature on long-term returns following a stock split ignores the existence of 
overoptimistic splitters and opportunistic splitters. These two types of splitters aggressively 
manage earnings and may split their stocks regardless of the fact that future earnings are not likely 
to be high enough to cover reversals. Our results provide evidence that many firms use stock split 
signals to support their inflated, rather than genuinely high, earnings. At stock split announcements, 
investors do not distinguish between these stocks and other stocks, so they react positively to both 
types. In the long-term, splits preceded by evidence of accruals and real activities management 
significantly underperform those not preceded by earnings management. Using both regression 
and portfolio tests, we find that pre-split earnings management negatively predicts long-term post-
split returns.  
A trading strategy of buying stocks with a low degree of pre-split earnings management 
and selling short stocks with a high degree of pre-split earnings management yields positive long-
term abnormal returns of around 100 basis points per month for a 12-month holding period. 
Regression tests show that the effect of pre-split earnings management on post-split long-term 
abnormal returns is not predicted by the effect of past returns or of other stock characteristics such 
as size, growth, dividends, leverage, and splitting price and factor. 
Our results contribute to the return predictability literature by showing that consideration 
of possible managerial incentives is mandatory for the study of long-term return predictability 
following stock splits. Our results also show that investors can use information on the concurrent 
use of accruals and RAM before stock splits to improve the predictability of long-term stock price 
performance. These results complement Louis and Robinson (2005) by showing that combining 
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earnings management signals and split signals is not always a means of communicating reliable 
private information. 
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Figure 1. Value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns 
This figure presents value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns following stock splits. Stock 
split month is month “0.” We report monthly CARs for the 24-month post-split period. 
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Table 1. Stock splits 1988-2011 
This table reports descriptive statistics for forward stock splits that took place during 1988-2011 for our final 
split sample of 5,155 split events. Panel A reports the number of stock splits per calendar year. Panel B 
categorizes stock splits by the listing exchange. Panel C categorizes stock splits by splitting factor. We also 
report the size and MTBV decile of stock split firms within each category in Panels A, B, and C. Panel D 
reports the number of stock split firms that belong to each quintile of firm size and MTBV. 
Panel A. Stock splits per year 1988-2011 
year No. Size decile MTBV decile year No. Size decile MTBV decile 
1988 23 6.4 6.5 2000 452 6.2 7.2 
1989 149 5.6 6.5 2001 166 6.2 7.3 
1990 126 6 7 2002 149 6.2 7 
1991 170 5.7 7 2003 150 5.5 6.7 
1992 275 6 6.7 2004 217 5.9 6.5 
1993 282 5.9 6.7 2005 246 6.1 6.7 
1994 233 5.9 6.7 2006 207 6.4 6.2 
1995 326 5.9 7 2007 162 6.5 6.7 
1996 422 5.7 6.9 2008 66 6.1 6.1 
1997 426 6.2 6.8 2009 19 5.4 6.1 
1998 411 6.3 6.8 2010 54 6.1 6.6 
1999 351 6.4 7.2 2011 73 6.1 6.7 
Panel B. Stock splits by listing exchange 
Exchange No.             % Size Decile MTBV decile 
NYSE 2,030 39.4 7.5 6.6 
AMEX 281 5.4 4.7 5.9 
NASDAQ 2,844 55.2 5.2 7 
Panel C. Stock splits by splitting factor. 
Splitting factor No.              % Size Decile MTBV decile 
SF≤1.5 : 1 247 4.8 5.5 6 
1.5:1< SF <2:1 1,737 33.7 5.5 6.6 
SF = 2:1 2,755 53.4 6.4 7.1 
SF > 2:1 416 8.1 6.6 6.2 
Panel D. Percentage of stock splits in each size and MTBV quintiles.  
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Size 2.04 10.03 26.62 32.06 29.25 
MTBV 2.7 5.8 13.91 29.49 48.09 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for earnings management ranked portfolios of stock splits 
Using double sorting based on abnormal cash flows and discretionary accruals we divide split firms into nine earnings management ranking 
portfolios M1:M9. M1 consists of firms with no evidence of accruals management or RAM one-year prior to their stock splits. M9 consists of 
firms with an evidence of both accruals management and RAM. Total assets and Total Assets_Decile are pre-split total assets and the decile rank 
based on total assets, respectively. MTBV and MTBV_Decile are pre-split market to book value and the decile rank based on market to book 
value, respectively. Sales is the net sales one year before the split year. Splitting Factor is the stock split splitting factor. Leverage is the ratio of 
long term debts to total assets. Pre-Split_Price is the stock price ten days prior to the split effective date. Pre-Split_Returns is the raw stock 
returns excluding dividends during the 12-month period prior to the split month. CAR-1,+1 is the split announcement day cumulative abnormal 
returns calculated using the market model over the 3 days period t-1,t+1. Post-Split_Returns is the raw stock returns in the 12-month period 
following the split month. BHARsp500 is the one year post split buy and hold abnormal returns, where the expected returns is the return for the 
S&P500 index. All return variables are presented in percentages. ROA is the returns on assets one year before the split year. Dacc is the pre-split 
discretionary accruals estimated as the residuals from the modified Jones (1991) model, and Acfo is the pre-split abnormal cash flow estimated 
as the residuals from the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Reported values are means. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
 Earnings management ranked portfolios M1-M9 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
No. Of Obs. 421 692 646 649 554 518 577 460 638 
Size (Mill.) 2,849 2,429 1,866 3,603 2,649 2,514 4,190 2,435 2,097 
Size_Decile 6.2 5.8 5.8 6.6 6 6 6.6 5.8 5.8 
MTBV 5.9 6.5 7 3.9 4.9 5 3.7 4.6 5.4 
MTBV_Decile 7.5 7.5 7.6 6.5 6.9 6.9 6 6.3 6.8 
Sales (Mill.) 1,795 1,719 1,057 2,353 1,783 1,666 2,612 1,840 1,385 
Splitting Factor 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Leverage 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.15 
Pre-Split_Price 60.5 56.6 59.6 53.5 49.9 53.2 49.5 49.8 53.3 
Pre-Split_Returns (%) 90 106 120 67 90 97 70 104 120 
CAR-1,+1 (%) 1.9 2.6 2.8 1.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.8 3.3 
Post-Split_Returns (%)  16 10 3 12 11 6 7 5 -4 
BHARsp500 (%)  11.9 3 7.5 3.3 3 4.4 1.1 2 -7.1 
ROA (%) 9.9 9.4 9.3 7.1 7.6 8.1 4.6 5.10 5.1 
Dacc 0.00 -0.27 0.34 0.00 -0.24 0.27 0.00 -0.24 0.31 
Acfo 0.35 0.41 0.46 0.08 0.09 0.09 -0.08 -0.18 -0.26 
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Table 3. Stock splits announcement returns based on earnings management portfolios 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the entire group of stock splits as well 
as for the nine earnings management ranking portfolios. M1 is a portfolio consisting of firms 
with the lowest degree of pre-split discretionary accruals and RAM. M9, on the other extreme, 
is a portfolio with the highest degree of pre-split discretionary accruals and RAM. CAR is 
calculated as ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡))
𝑇+𝑘
𝑡−𝑘  for three different announcement periods, t-1:t+1, t-3:t+3 
and t-5:t+5, where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the stock expected returns estimated using the market model. P-
values are between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
Portfolio No. of Obs. CAR -1,+1 CAR -3,+3 CAR -5,+5 
M1  
 
421 1.9*** 
(0.000) 
2.1*** 
(0.000) 
1.4*** 
(0.000) 
M2 
 
692 2.6*** 
(0.000) 
2.6*** 
(0.000) 
2.7*** 
(0.000) 
M3 
 
646 2.8*** 
(0.000) 
2.7*** 
(0.000) 
2.8*** 
(0.000) 
M4 
 
649 1.8*** 
(0.000) 
2.2*** 
(0.000) 
1.9*** 
(0.000) 
M5 
 
554 2.8*** 
(0.000) 
2.7*** 
(0.000) 
2.9*** 
(0.000) 
M6 
 
518 2.6*** 
(0.000) 
3.1*** 
(0.000) 
3.4*** 
(0.000) 
M7 
 
577 2.3*** 
(0.000) 
2.4*** 
(0.000) 
2.2*** 
(0.000) 
M8 
 
460 2.8*** 
(0.000) 
2.9*** 
(0.000) 
3.0*** 
(0.000) 
M9 
 
638 3.3*** 
(0.000) 
2.9*** 
(0.000) 
2.6*** 
(0.000) 
Portfolio M1-M9  -1.4*** 
(0.000) 
-0.8*** 
(0.000 
-1.2*** 
(0.000) 
All  5,155 2.8*** 
(0.000) 
3.1*** 
(0.000) 
3.0*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 4. Regression of stock split announcement returns 
This table reports coefficient estimates of the OLS regression of stock split announcement returns on 
earnings management variables and various control variables. Dependent variable is stock split 
announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR). For specifications 1 and 2, dependent variable is CAR-
1,+1. For specifications 3 and 4, dependent variable is CAR-3,+3. For specifications 5 and 6, dependent 
variable is CAR-5,+5. Portfolio M1-M9 is a dummy variable which takes the value “0” if the firm belongs 
to portfolio M9 and “1” if it belongs to portfolio M1. Acfo is the pre-split abnormal cash flow estimated 
as the residuals from the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Dacc is the pre-split discretionary accruals 
estimated as the residuals from the modified Jones (1991) model. Pre-Split_Returns is the raw stock 
returns during the 12-month period prior to the split month. Size is decile rank based on total assets. 
MTBV is the decile rank based on market to book value. Split_price is the price in the day just following 
the split effective day. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to total assets. Splitting Factor is the stock 
split splitting factor. Coefficients are estimated using industry fixed effects. P-values are between 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
 
CAR-1,+1  CAR-3,+3  CAR-5,+5  
(1) (2)  ( 3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Constant 0.042
*** 
(0.000) 
0.042*** 
(0.009) 
 0.051*** 
(0.000) 
0.046** 
(0.035) 
 0.063*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.003) 
Portfolio M1-M9  
 
-0.002 
(0.692) 
  -0.004 
(0.567) 
  -0.003 
(0.689) 
Acfo -0.002
* 
(0.084) 
  -0.005*** 
(0.009) 
  -0.005** 
(0.025) 
 
Dacc -0.000 
(0.967) 
  -0.001 
(0.395) 
  0.000 
(0.830) 
 
Pre-Split_Returns 0.001 
(0.136) 
0.003** 
(0.036) 
 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
 0.002** 
(0.014) 
0.005** 
(0.050) 
Size -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005** 
(0.012) 
 -0.011*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
MTBV -0.001* 
(0.054) 
-0.002* 
(0.081) 
 -0.001* 
(0.086) 
-0.003** 
(0.040) 
 -0.002** 
(0.012) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Split_price 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.001) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.036) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Leverage 0.005 
(0.443) 
0.009 
(0.524) 
 0.015 
(0.118) 
-0.013 
(0.505) 
 0.012 
(0.293) 
-0.021 
(0.430) 
Splitting Factor 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.215) 
 0.011*** 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.230) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.583) 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  3,448 705  3,448 705  3,448 705 
Adjusted R2 (%) 4.2 5.7  5.0 5.9  4.6 7.5 
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Table 5. Earnings management ranked portfolios Post-split buy and hold abnormal returns 
This table reports the average buy and hold abnormal returns for the nine earnings management-ranked 
portfolios M1:M9, where portfolio M1 includes stock splits with the lowest degree of pre-split earnings 
management, and portfolio M9 includes stock splits with the highest degree of pre-split earnings 
management. We also report the return differential between portfolio M1 and M9, M1-M9. For each 
stock, buy and hold abnormal return is measured as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  ∏ [ 1 +  𝑅𝑖,𝑡]– ∏  [ 1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)]
250
𝑡=1
250
𝑡=1  , 
where Ri,t is the total rate of return of stock i on day t and E(Ri,t) is the expected return for each security i 
on day t. BHARref is the one-year buy and hold abnormal returns, where expected return is the return for 
size and book-to-market reference portfolio. BHARsp500 is the one-year buy and hold abnormal returns, 
where expected return is the return for S&P500 composite index. BHARind is the one-year buy and hold 
abnormal returns, where expected return is the return for firm-specific Fama-French 48 industry. P-values 
are reported in Parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
 one-year post-split abnormal returns 
Portfolio BHARref  BHARsp500  BHARind 
M1  
 
5.5* 
(0.051) 
 11.9*** 
(0.000) 
 5.5* 
(0.070) 
M2 
 
6.9*** 
(0.000) 
 3.00 
( 0.161) 
 -2.6 
(0.247) 
M3 
 
4.3* 
(0.097) 
 7.5** 
(0.013) 
 5.9* 
(0.056) 
M4 
 
-1.7 
(0.261) 
 3.3* 
(0.056) 
 1.2 
(0.533) 
M5 
 
-3.8* 
(0.056) 
 3.0 
(0.169) 
 2.1 
(0.370) 
M6 
 
-3 
(0.286) 
 4.4 
( 0.139) 
 2.2 
(0.518) 
M7 
 
-4.5*** 
(0.006) 
 1.1 
(0.593) 
 -2.8 
(0.220) 
M8 
 
-6.5** 
(0.018) 
 2.00 
(0.452) 
 -1.6 
(0.636) 
M9 
 
-16*** 
(0.000) 
 -7.1*** 
(0.003) 
 -5.8** 
(0.017) 
Portfolio M1-M9 22*** 
(0.000) 
 19.1*** 
(0.000) 
 11.2*** 
(0.003) 
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Table 6. Cross section predictive regression of post-split long-term stock returns 
This table reports coefficient estimates from predictive regressions of post-split long-term returns on pre-
split earnings management and control variables. We use three different dependent variables to represent 
post-split long-term returns. BHARref is the one-year buy and hold abnormal returns, where expected 
return is the return for size and book-to-market reference portfolio. BHARsp500 is the one-year buy and 
hold abnormal returns, where expected return is the return for S&P500 composite index. BHARind is the 
one-year buy and hold abnormal returns, where expected return is the return for firm-specific Fama-
French 48 industry. Portfolio M1-M9 is a dummy variable which takes the value “0” if the firm belongs 
to portfolio M9 and “1” if it belongs to portfolio M1. Acfo is the pre-split abnormal cash flow estimated 
as the residuals from the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Dacc is the pre-split discretionary accruals 
estimated as the residuals from the modified Jones (1991) model. Pre-split return is the raw stock returns 
excluding dividends during the 12-month period prior to the split month. Size is decile rank based on 
total assets. MTBV is the decile rank based on market to book value. Split_price is the price in the day 
just following the split effective day. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to total assets. Splitting 
Factor is the stock split splitting factor. Coefficients are estimated using industry fixed effects. P-values 
are between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
 BHARref  BHARsp500  BHARind 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Constant -0.396*** 
(0.000) 
-0.514*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.478*** 
(0.000) 
-0.645*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.466*** 
(0.000) 
-0.682*** 
(0.000) 
Portfolio M1-M9 
 
0.089** 
(0.026) 
 
 
0.100** 
(0.035) 
 
 
0.044** 
(0.048) 
Acfo 0.015 
(0.217) 
 
 0.021 
(0.190) 
  0.011 
(0.455) 
 
Dacc -0.017* 
(0.075) 
 
 -0.010 
(0.398) 
  0.012 
(0.281) 
 
Pre-split return -0.029*** 
(0.000) 
-0.053*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.007 
(0.204) 
-0.034*** 
(0.010) 
 -0.001 
(0.802) 
-0.021* 
(0.099) 
Size 0.009* 
(0.089) 
-0.000 
(0.976) 
 0.000 
(0.928) 
-0.005 
(0.697) 
 0.001 
(0.785) 
-0.003 
(0.796) 
MTBV 0.053*** 
(0.000) 
0.056*** 
(0.000) 
 0.074*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
0.070*** 
(0.000) 
Split price -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.248) 
 -0.000 
(0.509) 
-0.000 
(0.926) 
 0.000 
(0.654) 
0.001 
(0.409) 
Leverage 0.109** 
(0.044) 
0.177 
(0.123) 
 0.210*** 
(0.003) 
0.453*** 
(0.001) 
 0.191*** 
(0.004) 
0.506*** 
(0.000) 
Splitting Factor 0.011 
(0.445) 
0.059 
(0.185) 
 0.012 
(0.534) 
0.068 
(0.202) 
 0.018 
(0.323) 
0.074 
(0.154) 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 3,448 705  3,448 705  3,448 705 
Adjusted R2 5.9 10.8  4.8 8.9  3.9 7.1 
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Table 7. Four-factors alphas for calendar month zero-investment portfolios 
This table reports the four factors model alphas estimated as the intercepts from the four factors model 
consisting of Fama-French (1993) three-factors and Carhart (1997) momentum factor. We estimate alphas for 
the zero-investment portfolio of buying portfolio M1 and selling portfolio M9 short. We report four different 
post-split holding periods, 12-month, 24-month, 36-month and 12-month starts 6 months after the split month. 
We report both equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. Panel A reports results for portfolios formed 
with all stock splits. Panel B reports results excluding splits announced within 45 days of the fiscal year end. 
Panel C reports results excluding splits announced within 60 days of the fiscal year end. Panel D reports 
results excluding splits announced within 75 days of the fiscal year end. Estimates are reported in % per 
month. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
Portfolio M1-M9 +1,+12 +1,+24 +1,+36 +6,+18 
Panel A. All splits. 
Equally-weighted 1*** 
(0.003) 
0.7*** 
(0.002) 
0.4* 
(0.070) 
0.8** 
(0.025) 
Value-weighted 0.9** 
(0.034) 
0.7** 
(0.039) 
0.7** 
(0.017) 
1** 
(0.019) 
Panel B. All splits excluding cases announced within 45 days of fiscal year end. 
Equally-weighted 0.9** 
(0.036) 
0.8*** 
(0.009) 
0.5** 
(0.048) 
0.8** 
(0.026) 
Value-weighted 0.9* 
(0.057) 
0.6* 
(0.076) 
0.8** 
(0.013) 
1** 
(0.032) 
Panel C. All splits excluding cases announced within 60 days of fiscal year end. 
Equally-weighted 0.9** 
(0.032) 
0.8** 
(0.011) 
0.5* 
(0.057) 
0.7** 
(0.042) 
Value-weighted 0.9* 
(0.054) 
0.6 
(0.109) 
0.8** 
(0.016) 
0.8* 
(0.088) 
Panel D. All splits excluding cases announced within 75 days of fiscal year end. 
Equally-weighted 0.8* 
(0.100) 
0.5 
(0.165) 
0.7** 
(0.026) 
0.8* 
(0.088) 
Value-weighted 0.7* 
(0.081) 
0.6** 
(0.037) 
0.4 
(0.132) 
0.6* 
(0.075) 
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  Table 8. Different explanations of stock splits 
This table reports coefficient estimates of the logistic regression models of the likelihood of firms to 
participate in portfolio M9 splits. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to “1” if the split 
belongs to portfolio M9, and “0” otherwise. Post_2001 is a dummy variable that equals “1” for the years 
after 2001, and “0” otherwise. Agg_household is the aggregate value of equity owned by U.S. household. 
Agg_institutional is the aggregate value of equity owned by U.S. domestic financial institutions. 
Inst_ownership is the percentage of a firm’s stocks owned by institutions. Net_insider_trading is the 
number of a CEO’s buy transaction minus sell transactions during the six-month period surrounding a 
split announcement date. Acfo is the pre-split abnormal cash flow estimated as the residuals from the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model. Dacc is the pre-split discretionary accruals estimated as the residuals from 
the modified Jones (1991) model. Pre-split return is the stock raw returns excluding dividends during 
the 12-month period prior to the split month. Size is decile rank based on total assets. MTBV is the decile 
rank based on market to book value. Split_price is the price in the day just following the split effective 
day. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to total assets. Splitting Factor is the stock split splitting 
factor. P-values are between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -1.511*** 
(0.000) 
-1.218*** 
(0.004) 
-1.274*** 
(0.002) 
-1.573 
(0.000) 
-1.012** 
(0.032) 
Post_2001 -0.169 
(0.224) 
   0.110 
(0.757) 
Agg_household  -0.000 
0.381 
  -0.000 
0.485 
Agg_institutional  0.000 
0.940 
  0.000 
(0.542) 
Inst_ownership  0.031 
(0.901) 
  0.030 
(0.902) 
Catering   -0.028** 
(0.018) 
 -0.057 
(0.245) 
Net_insider_trading    -3.571* 
(0.056) 
-3.983** 
(0.038) 
Acfo -2.069*** 
(0.000) 
-2.092*** 
(0.000) 
-2.087*** 
(0.000) 
-2.065*** 
(0.000)  
-2.081*** 
(0.000) 
Dacc 1.499*** 
(0.000) 
1.493*** 
(0.000) 
1.504*** 
(0.000) 
1.493*** 
(0.000) 
1.499*** 
(0.000) 
Pre-split return 0.036 
(0.128) 
0.038 
(0.108) 
0.035 
(0.132) 
0.038 
(0.103) 
0.038 
(0.104) 
Size -0.020 
(0.608) 
-0.031 
(0.449) 
-0.030 
(0.465) 
-0.017 
(0.673) 
-0.034 
(0.408) 
MTBV -0.020 
(0.516) 
-0.021 
(0.492) 
-0.021 
(0.490) 
-0.019 
(0.535) 
-0.022 
(0.476) 
Split price -0.005 
(0.209) 
-0.002 
(0.616) 
-0.003 
(0.458) 
-0.006 
(0.139) 
-0.002 
(0.596) 
Leverage 1.090*** 
(0.003) 
1.102*** 
(0.003) 
1.090*** 
(0.003) 
1.118*** 
(0.002) 
1.129*** 
(0.002) 
Splitting Factor -0.189 
(0.186) 
-0.166 
(0.242) 
-0.170 
(0.230) 
-0.192 
(0.176) 
-0.159 
(0.262) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448 
- Log likelihood 1,015 1,013 1,013 1,014 1,010 
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Table 9. Standalone return predictability: Discretionary accruals vs. RAM 
This table reports buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARref) of portfolios of splits ranked based on pre-split earnings management. Panel A reports results for 
tercile, quintile, and decile ranked portfolios, respectively. Panel B reports OLS regression of the determinants of one-year post-split BHARref. EM_dummy is 
earnings management dummy that takes the value of “1” if the firm belongs to the High earnings management portfolio and “0” if it belongs to the Low earnings 
management portfolio. In panel B. the sample that is used in each model is highlighted in the column heading. Other control variables are defined in the same 
manner explained earlier. P-values are between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. BHARs of discretionary accruals and RAM ranked portfolios 
   Dacc  Acfo 
 Tercile rank  Quintile rank Decile rank  Tercile rank Quintile rank Decile rank 
No. of Obs. 2,039 2,173 4,212 1,217 1,304 2,521 601 651 1,252  1,637 1,620 3,257 972 942 1,914 488 451 939 
BHARref High Low H-L High Low H-L High Low H-L  High Low H-L High Low H-L High Low H-L 
All -0.07 
 
0.01 -0.08*** 
(0.000) 
-0.09 0.01 -0.09*** 
(0.000) 
-0.13 0.02 -0.15*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06*** 
(0.000) 
-0.12 -0.01 -0.10*** 
(0.000) 
-0.17 -0.4 -0.13*** 
(0.000) 
Y<1996 -0.03 
 
0.03 -0.06*** 
(0.000) 
-0.03 0.03 -0.06*** 
(0.000) 
-0.08 0.04 -0.12*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 
(0.205) 
-0.07 -0.01 -0.06 
(0.267) 
-0.5 0.03 -0.08 
(0.396) 
1997-2003 -0.11 
 
-0.04 -0.06* 
(0.064) 
-0.14 -.04 -0.09** 
(0.027) 
-0.19 -0.01 -0.18*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.16 -0.05 -0.11*** 
(0.000) 
-0.19 -0.02 -0.17*** 
(0.000) 
-0.25 -0.08 
 
-0.17*** 
(0.005) 
2004-2010 -0.04 0.03 -0.08*** 
(0.009) 
-0.03 0.00 -0.03 
(0.428) 
-0.03 0.01 -0.04 
(0.408) 
 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 
(0.171) 
-0.02 0.01 -0.04 
(0.340) 
-0.06 0.00 -0.06 
(0.244) 
Panel B. OLS regression: determinants of post-split BHAR 
 (1) top and bottom  
Dacc terciles 
(2) top and bottom 
Dacc quintiles 
(3) top and bottom 
Dacc deciles 
 (4) top and bottom 
Acfo terciles 
(5) top and bottom 
Acfo quintiles 
(6) top and bottom 
Acfo deciles 
Constant 
 
-0.21*** 
(0.000) 
-0.18*** 
(0.002) 
-0.09 
(0.270) 
 -0.35*** 
(0.000) 
-0.44*** 
(0.000) 
-0.53*** 
(0.000) 
EM_dummy 
 
-0.06*** 
(0.000) 
-0.06*** 
(0.002) 
-0.09*** 
(0.001) 
 0.00 
(0.916) 
0.02 
(0.345) 
0.02 
(0.613) 
Pre-Split_Returns 
 
-0.03*** 
(0.000) 
-0.04*** 
(0.000) 
-0.09*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.04*** 
(0.000) 
-0.03*** 
(0.001) 
-0.03*** 
(0.005) 
Size 
 
0.00 
(0.645) 
0.00 
(0.796) 
0.00 
(0.573) 
 0.00 
(0.171) 
0.01* 
(0.098) 
0.01 
(0.171) 
MTBV 
 
0.04*** 
(0.000) 
0.04*** 
(0.000) 
0.03*** 
(0.000) 
 0.04*** 
(0.000) 
0.05*** 
(0.000) 
0.06*** 
(0.000) 
Split_price 
 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.008) 
-0.00 
(0.122) 
 -0.00*** 
(0.003) 
-0.00*** 
(0.008) 
-0.00* 
(0.097) 
Leverage 
 
0.13*** 
(0.007) 
0.12** 
(0.044) 
0.09 
(0.209) 
 0.13** 
(0.017) 
0.17** 
(0.025) 
0.18* 
(0.079) 
Splitting Factor 
 
-0.00 
(0.505) 
-0.00 
(0.740) 
-0.00 
(0.865) 
 0.00 
(0.957) 
-0.01 
(0.567) 
-0.01 
(0.461) 
No. of Obs.  3,652 2,165 1,057  2,844 1,640 774 
Adjusted R2  5.0 5.0 7.6  5.5 6.0 7.7 
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Table 10. Post-split long-term stock returns and the effect of stock splits 
This table compares the long-term abnormal returns of the treatment group (Aggressive_Splits) and the 
matched control group (Aggressive_Non_Splits) in Panel A. Panel B reports coefficient estimates from 
predictive regressions of post-split long-term returns for the treatment group (Aggressive_Splits) and the 
control group (Aggressive_Non_Splits). Dependent variable in models (1) and (2), BHARref, is the one-
year buy and hold abnormal returns, where expected return is the return for size and book-to-market 
reference portfolio. Dependent variable in models (3) and (4), BHARsp500, is the one-year buy and hold 
abnormal returns, where expected return is the return for S&P500 composite index. Dependent variable 
in models (5) and (6), BHARind, is the one-year buy and hold abnormal returns, where expected return is 
the return for firm-specific Fama-French 48 industry. Aggressive_Splitter is a dummy variable which 
equals “1” if the firm belongs to the treatment group (Aggressive_Splits) and equals “0” if it belongs to 
the control group (Aggressive_Non_Splits). Pre-split return is the raw stock returns excluding dividends 
during the 12-month period prior to the split month. Size is decile rank based on total assets. MTBV is 
the decile rank based on market to book value. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to total assets. 
Acfo is the pre-split abnormal cash flow. Dacc is the pre-split discretionary accruals. Coefficients are 
estimated using industry fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent 
levels. 
Panel A. Post-split abnormal returns of Aggressive_Splits and Aggressive_Non_Splits 
 Treatment (Aggressive_Splits) Control (Aggressive_Non_Splits) Difference 
BHARref -15.6*** 
(0.000) 
-9.6*** 
(0.001) 
-5.9* 
(0.088) 
BHARsp500 -17.7*** 
(0.000) 
-9.8*** 
(0.001) 
-7.9** 
(0.024) 
BHARind -13.7*** 
(0.000) 
-9.6*** 
(0.001) 
-4.0 
(0.226) 
Panel B. OLS regression: determinants of post-split abnormal returns. 
 BHARref  BHARsp500  BHARind 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Constant -0.10*** 
(0.000) 
0.13** 
(0.027) 
 -0.10*** 
(0.000) 
-0.05 
(0.453) 
 -0.10*** 
(0.000) 
-0.06 
(0.291) 
Aggressive_Splitter -0.06* 
(0.088) 
-0.10*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.08** 
(0.024) 
-0.12*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.04 
(0.226) 
-0.09*** 
(0.007) 
Pre-split return 
  
-0.00 
(0.317) 
 
 
-0.00 
(0.120) 
 
 
-0.00* 
(0.090) 
Size 
  
-0.01 
(0.763) 
 
 
0.02* 
(0.061) 
 
 
0.03** 
(0.034) 
MTBV 
  
-0.07*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.02* 
(0.081) 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.153) 
Leverage 
  
0.13 
(0.150) 
 
 
0.13 
(0.150) 
 
 
0.08 
(0.331) 
Acfo 
  
0.07*** 
(0.009) 
 
 
0.09*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.05* 
(0.056) 
Dacc 
  
0.01 
(0.676) 
 
 
0.02 
(0.348) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.588) 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 1,349 973  1,349 973  1,349 973 
Adjusted R2 1.0 4.9  1.0 4.0  0.1 2.4 
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Table 11. Robustness tests 
This table reports the one-year buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARref) for portfolio M1, M9 and M1-
M9. Panel A reports returns for dividend paying stocks and non-dividend paying stocks. Panel B reports 
returns for firms that increase dividends simultaneously with splits versus firms that do not. Panel C reports 
returns for large versus small stocks. Large (small) stocks are firms with above (below) median total assets 
at the split year. Panel D reports returns for glamour versus value stocks. We define glamour (value) stocks 
as firms with above (below) median market to book value. Panel E reports returns for stock splits with a 
2:1 splitting factor versus all other stock splits. Panel F reports returns for splits that took place during 
1989-2000 versus splits that took place during 2001-2011. Panel G reports returns for splits conducted by 
firms with high (above median) and low (below median) institutional ownership. Estimates are reported 
in percentages. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
Panel A. Long-term buy and hold post-split returns by dividends paying 
 BHARref 
 M1 M9  M1-M9  
Dividends payer 8*** 
(0.010) 
-9*** 
(0.000) 
17.5*** 
(0.000) 
Non-dividend payer 2.6 
(0.593) 
-21*** 
(0.000) 
23.6*** 
(0.000) 
Panel B. Long-term buy and hold post-split returns by Dividends change 
Dividend increase 4.8* 
(0.100) 
-15*** 
(0.000) 
19.8*** 
(0.000) 
Non-dividend increase 14.8 
(0.117) 
-25*** 
(0.000) 
39.8*** 
(0.000) 
Panel C. Long-term buy and hold post-split returns by size 
Small firms 5.4 
(0.311) 
-19*** 
(0.000) 
24.5*** 
(0.000) 
Large firms  5.6* 
(0.081) 
-14*** 
(0.000) 
19.6*** 
(0.000) 
Panel D. Long-term buy and hold post-split returns by MTBV 
Value stocks -2.3 
(0.540) 
-22*** 
(0.000) 
19.7*** 
(0.000) 
Glamour stocks  9.4** 
(0.016) 
-12*** 
(0.000) 
21.4*** 
(0.000) 
Panel E. Long-term buy and hold post-split returns by Splitting Factor 
Split factor=2:1 5.3 
(0.153) 
-18*** 
(0.000) 
23.5*** 
(0.000) 
Split factors≠2:1 5.7 
(0.186) 
-15*** 
(0.000) 
20.7*** 
(0.000) 
Panel F. Long-term buy and hold post-split returns by Time 
1988-1999 1.6 
(0.713) 
-14*** 
(0.000) 
15.6*** 
(0.000) 
2000-2011 9.5*** 
(0.004) 
-19*** 
(0.000) 
28.5*** 
(0.000) 
Panel G. Long-term buy and hold post-split returns by Institutional ownership 
High inst. ownership 16.2*** 
(0.000) 
-5.6** 
(0.048) 
21.8*** 
(0.000) 
Low inst. ownership 13.0 
(0.105) 
-8.4* 
(0.054) 
21.4*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
